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DISSENT IN CHICAGO: The Response
of Local Government
Raymond F. Simon*
The legal interests and responsibilities of a city attorney are varied.
However, the main topic of conversation between city attorneys them-
selves for the past few years has been an area of law which currently is
being refined and developed and which vitally concerns every citizen-
lawyer. That topic is the law as it applies to and is applied by local
governments with regard to the right of dissent and the control of dis-
order.
A brief review of Chicago's experience in the last decade illustrates
the problems typical to most municipalities in this newly developing
area of law.
The first "demonstration" at City Hall occurred in 1961 when mem-
bers of the Harrison-Halsted community "sat in" the Mayor's office to
protest the clearance of their neighborhood to make way for the Chicago
Circle Campus of the University of Illinois. Their technique of express-
ing dissent by direct action was very effective as a means of attracting
public attention. This technique evolved into an era of picketing.
City Hall, the Board of Education, and the Real Estate Board all
became targets. Variations included romantic incidents like the "Save
Our Trees" efforts opposing tree removal in Jackson Park and the
more mercenary antics of the coin-operated laundry owners who jammed
the switchboard at City Hall with calls objecting to the ordinance
that required an attendant for the laundromats that wished to operate
all night.
By the middle of the decade, large demonstrations were becoming
the order of the day. In the summer of 1966 Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. led numerous nonviolent marches into residential areas of the city.
Dick Gregory led marches from Buckingham Fountain to City Hall
every day over an extended period of time. This form of protest finally
proliferated to the point where the average pedestrian no longer took
notice of the marchers but simply elbowed his way through the crowds
* A member of the Illinois Bar, Mr. Simon served as Corporation Counsel of the
City of Chicago from 1965-1970.
Loyola University Law Journal
and the newspapers failed to more than mention the event.
Parallel to, but different from, the organized demonstrations of dis-
sent on specific topics, was the violent disorder that Chicago experi-
enced. The riots around Division Street in the summer of 1966 and
the West Side riots which occurred after Dr. King's death in April of
1968 are the chief examples of this. At this point demonstrations of
dissent and incidents of riot were clearly distinguishable.
During the Democratic Convention in the late summer of 1968,
Chicago experienced the employment of disorder as a technique for
demonstrating political dissent: the Strategy of Confrontation had
emerged.' Only recently Chicago witnessed the destructive tactics of the
Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society as it
rampaged through the Near North Side and the Loop in a senseless orgy
of violence.
One hundred years ago Abraham Lincoln posed the problem in
these words: "Must a government of necessity be too strong for the
liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence? ' 2
A responsible government must respond to this problem on two levels.
The first level is tactical: the government must maintain peace while
protecting the rights of the dissenters and of the public. The second
level is preventive: the government must develop programs and proj-
ects designed to cure social ills which, if unattended, often result in
violent disorder.
Chicago has shown initiative in the preventive level of governmental
response. To enumerate all that has been accomplished in the last
decade to improve housing, to provide job training and attract industry,
to provide jobs, to utilize available federal funds for Headstart and
health programs, to try to assure open housing, to up-grade the police
department, to protect the consumer, and to work out a viable Model
Cities Program involves more statistics than could be digested in this
article and could be the subject of a separate and more comprehensive
discussion.3
The present situation, however, is far from ideal. Much remains to
be accomplished in Chicago; however, no other city is doing better, and
1. See generally Simon, The Strategy of Confrontation: Chicago and the Demo-
cratic National Convention-1968; WALKER, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT, REPORT TO THE NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE (1969).
2. 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 426 (Rutgers University Press
1953).
3. Some of the programs are discussed in Report of the Chicago Riot Study
Committee ("Austin Report") 1968, at 123 et seq.
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few are doing as well, in the task of confronting the challenges of
modem urban life.
Because government administrators continually must make value
judgments as to priorities in reform, it would be naive to hope for a
utopia in which everyone is satisfied. Anguish speaks with many ac-
cents. The black man, the red man, the Appalachian, the Oriental,
the Latin, the first-generation European immigrant and, yes, even the
White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant: each has his own needs, his own hopes.
The special problems of the many groups that make up our society are
frequently in conflict with each other. Often the conflict is simply a
matter of priorities within a limited public budget. Thus, it seems un-
likely that positive programs will cause dissent to wither away. More-
over, many of the overriding concerns of the people-such as the war
in Vietnam-simply cannot be affected by local government. Yet it
is local government that must deal with the public protest that these con-
cerns evoke. Therefore, while we plan and work for improvements,
we must hold the fabric of our society together and keep our govern-
ment operating. Tactical responses to dissent and disorder must be
forged.
The Chicago police department and City officials have, through in-
tensive training and experience, learned much about the tactics of coping
with civil disorder and illegal action on the streets.
The early riots resulted in great confusion. For example, when a
police van with arrestees pulled up to police headquarters, our lawyers
would be on hand to prepare the charges. A lawyer would question
the driver of the van as to what the prisoners had done. The driver
would respond "Well-I don't know." "Where were they arrested?"
"Well, uh-I don't know exactly." "What did they do wrong?" "Look,
Mac, I just drive the van-I don't know anything!" Inexperience in
processing riot arrests resulted in many such frustrating exchanges. It
soon became clear that it was physically impossible to compose a de-
tailed police report while a riot was in progress.
As a result of these early experiences, the evidence technician ap-
peared in the police department. Now police department personnel and
assistant corporation counsel go to the scene of each occurrence. A
standard arrest procedure has been developed. For example, a police
officer steps up to a protester lying in the middle of a thoroughfare. The
officer identifies himself, requests the protester to identify himself, and
then informs the protester what the law of obstructing traffic is. The
officer requests that the protester desist from his unlawful action. This
1970
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entire exchange is taped by the evidence technician. The evidence
technician also photographs the arresting officer and the arrestee for
identification purposes. This procedure has proved invaluable. In a
trial situation, evidence is readily available for purposes of identification,
and for proving that the protester was informed, prior to his arrest, that
his actions were illegal. Such evidence also serves the purpose of re-
butting a defendant's claim of police brutality or denial of his civil
rights.
Experience also teaches that with a serious disorder the call for addi-
tional outside forces should be made at the earliest possible moment.
Even anticipation of a potentially dangerous situation is reason to alert
the National Guard, as recommended by the National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders.4 The protection of the rights of the non-
participating citizen is just as important as the protection of the rights
of the dissenter. (An aspect all too often overlooked in our discussion.)
Another essential in the development of knowledge in response to
dissent has been the realization that for several reasons mass arrests are
a failure. When a municipality is confronted with the task of arresting
hundreds or even thousands of people, the logistics of the problem are
overwhelming. Where are the detention facilities to contain such a num-
ber of people? Where is the gigantic court machinery needed to try such
a mass of defendants? Where are the lawyers to which each of the
thousands are entitled?
Mass arrests not only clog the courts, but also result in a polarization
of feelings between the police and the government on one side and
the citizens arrested on the other side. Many times during mass arrests
the infractions charged are very minor. If an arrestee does not post
bond, his period of incarceration before his trial can exceed the amount
of time a conviction would impose. Also the tactics of the arrestees
in a mass arrest situation can further challenge the functioning of the
courts-witness the recent statement of the Weatherman "legal advis-
ers" that arrestees should "catch" the court and police "off guard" by
demanding immediate jury trials upon being taken before the magistrate.
Hostility also develops in another group. Parents rarely believe
that their children would do anything seriously wrong and often feel
that the police took advantage of the situation to arrest their "innocent"
offspring. Whether or not the actions of the children that result in mass
arrests are lawful or unlawful, as a practical matter alienation and
4. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders ("Kerner
Report") 488.
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hostility on the part of some parents must be anticipated and dealt with
responsibly. Such reactions on the part of some segments of the citi-
zenry make it all the more difficult to solve fundamental problems that
require cooperation and trust on the part of the entire community.
One alternative to mass arrests is what may be called a "symbolic"
arrest. This is an arrest of the leaders of a mob engaged in unlawful
protest. The leaders are charged with the most serious offense that a
legal evaluation of their conduct justifies. A serious charge against a
violent leader who goaded his followers into illegitimate dissent is more
effective than several minor charges against those followers. This alter-
native also results in a lessening of the polarization of emotions. One
caveat should be emphasized: In making a "symbolic" arrest, it is
important to have a strong and almost uncontestible case against the
arrestee. A weaker case may defeat the purpose of the "symbolic" ar-
rest, by making a martyr of the arrestee.
There is no question but that situations occur in which dissenters
force police into a confrontation-and-arrest situation. For example, in
the face of a rampaging mob breaking windows with great abandon
in a residential district, arrests are the only method of halting the vio-
lent tide.
But experience has taught that where possible (i.e. where permitted
by the demonstrators) persuasion and restraint are the best responses
possible. These tactics proved extremely successful in the summer of
1969 when the Black Coalition protested hiring and training programs
in the construction industry. Very few arrests were made as a result.
When large groups of labor union members attempted to disrupt hear-
ings by the Department of Labor, persuasion and restraint again proved
to be an effective response. Four thousand angry workers tried barring
entrance to those who wanted to be heard at the hearings, but excellent
police work involving persuasion and restraint resulted in the opening
of the entrances. The group thereafter marched peacefully to the
Civic Center and made their speeches. The protest had been heard.
Peace had been preserved. Persuasion and restraint had proved the
proper responses to a precipitous situation. The result was lawful,
peaceful dissent.
It is essential in all such situations that the position of the munici-
pality be made clear to the public. In other words, a necessary parallel
to government's continuing self-education on the subject of dissent is the
education of the public as to what constitutes lawful dissent. It must
be made clear that protest is a legitimate activity provided it remains
1970
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lawful. It remains lawful only when it is peaceful, or free of any ac-
companying illegal behavior.
It seems proper at this point to observe, that, despite what appears to
be a pervasive popular attitude to the contrary, the judicial system in
general, and the Supreme Court of the United States in particular, have
laid down rules dealing with dissent that protect the public. News-
paper headlines sometimes suggest that this is not so. The legal pro-
fession, however, must go beyond the headlines to the cases themselves.
For example, in Cox v. Louisiana,5 Mr. Justice Goldberg indicated
the precedence which must be given to maintaining order:
The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our
democratic society, still do not mean that every one with opinions
or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at
any time. The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy.6
Also, in the other Cox case, namely, Cox v. New Hampshire,7 Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote that:
The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to
assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public
highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties
but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon
which they ultimately depend. 8
When the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was leading marches
through residential sections in Chicago during the summer of 1966,
the City assured the protesters of police protection. When multiple
marches on a given day plus numerous breakdowns in communica-
tions about where the marches were going to occur caused excessive
manpower pressures on the police force, it became necessary to seek
greater regulation of the marches. The City sought an order limiting
the protest to one location at any one time and to a maximum of 500
participants; 24-hour notice of a demonstration was requested, as was
a restriction of marches to daylight hours other than those of peak traf-
fic periods. The order was granted and upheld by the Illinois ap-
pellate court; certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. 9
The city's police department was saved from exhaustion, all citizens were
5. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
6. Id. at 554.
7. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
8. Id. at 574.
9. City of Chicago v. King, 86 11M. App. 2d 340, 230 N.E.2d 41 (1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1028 (1968).
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assured of normal police protection, and at the same time the right of
protest was protected.
In Adderley v. Florida,10 the court affirmed the right of a State to
deny access to public property for demonstrations, saying:
The State, no less than a private owner of property, has the power
to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated. For this reason there is no merit to the peti-
tioners' argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on
the property, over the jail custodian's objections, because this
'area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not
only 'reasonable' but also particularly appropriate. . . .' Such an
argument has as its major unarticulated premise the assumption that
people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitu-
tional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they
please. That concept of constitutional law was vigorously and
forthrightly rejected."
These attitudes, along with a recognition that there is a distinction
between "pure" speech on the one hand, and mass demonstrations,
picketing, and parades on the other hand, 2 have been reaffirmed in
more recent decisions.
One of these, Walker v. City of Birmingham,'3 upheld the injunc-
tive power of a state court when civil rights demonstrators refused to
seek a local permit before engaging in a protest parade, and in so doing
disobeyed a court order. The majority opinion, lucidly written by Mr.
Justice Stewart, makes several relevant distinctions that should serve as
guideposts for public attorneys. In limiting its holding to the single
issue of the deliberate disobedience of a court order, the Court expressed
doubts concerning the "generality of the language contained in the
Birmingham parade ordinance"; it worried about "the breadth and
vagueness of the injunction itself" and it suggested that the "arbitrary
or discriminatory administration of the ordinance" would have been a
relevant consideration had the protesters chosen to contest the order.' 4
In another recent case, Cameron v. Johnson,'5 the Supreme Court up-
held Mississippi's anti-picketing laws which made it unlawful to inter-
fere with free access to and from any courthouse or other public
building. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion, like Justice Stewart's in
10. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
11. Id. at 47, 48.
12. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). The distinction has
been criticized by Professor Harry Kalven in Kalven, The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 S. CT. REV. 1, 22-25.
13. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
14. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
15. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
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Walker, is instructive on the question of the vagueness and unnecessary
broadness of legislation.
In this connection, we should consider the recent decision in Gregory
v. City of Chicago.'6 The United States Supreme Court did not strike
down the City of Chicago disorderly conduct ordinance in deciding the
Gregory case. In my opinion the reason why they did not was the nar-
row construction placed upon the ordinance by the Illinois Supreme
Court, which construction, of course, was urged upon that court by
the City of Chicago. In the context of the Gregory case, the Illinois
Supreme Court 7 defined disorderly conduct to exist when:
(1) There is an imminent threat of violence;
(2) The police have made all reasonable efforts to protect the
demonstrators;
(3) The police have requested that the demonstration be stopped;
(4) The police have explained the request, if there is time;
(5) The request has been refused.
Language almost identical to the foregoing was written into the re-
vised City of Chicago disorderly conduct ordinance 8 at the time the
Gregory case was being reviewed by the Supreme Court.
There are other examples of the way in which we have followed ju-
dicial guidelines in drafting ordinances. In response to the fact situa-
tion that led to the Gregory case, the Illinois General Assembly, in 1967,
enacted a bill prohibiting residential picketing.' 9 This provision is
supported by a judicial awareness that there are places for protest and
there are places not for protest.2" The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in Wolin v. Port of New York Authority,2' describes the relevant
factors in testing protest in public places in this way:
[D]oes the character of the place, the pattern of usual activity, the
nature of its essential purpose and the population who take ad-
vantage of the general invitation extended make it an appropriate
place for communication of views .... 2
The court there thought the Port Authority's bus terminal an appropri-
ate place; we believe that by the same standards residential areas are
16. 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
17. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 39 IlI. 2d 47, 233 N.E.2d 422 (1968), rev'd, 394
U.S. Ill (1969).
18. 1968 J. Proc. City Council, City of Chicago 2561-2 (March 26, 1968).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38 § 21.1-2 (1967).
20. See Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L.
REV. 177 (1967).
21. 392 F.2d 83 (2nd Cit. 1968).
22. Id. at 89.
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clearly inappropriate, and that our residential picketing law does not
violate First Amendment rights.
There is an additional aspect of Gregory v. City of Chicago that de-
serves comment. Although the marchers' audience was hostile, it is
clear that the police provided every protection possible to the demon-
strators. Only at night, when the crowds of onlookers threatened to
become unmanageable, was any effort made to halt the demonstration.
The question is thus raised by the situation in Gregory whether action
might ever be taken to disperse demonstrators, who may themselves
be relatively quiet and orderly, when crowd control taxes police re-
sources and a riot seems imminent. Gregory did not answer this
question. It is true that Feiner v. New York2" upheld a breach-of-the-
peace conviction, but there, unlike the Gregory situation, the demon-
strators had undertaken "incitement to riot." Furthermore, Feiner
uses the "clear and present danger" test, a judicial measuring rod that
has not been employed in recent years and may have become of histori-
cal interest only.24 Unhappily, one of the few judicial utterances on this
subject is not encouraging, for it finds that speech "may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger."' 25  The difficulty is that stirring people to anger may have
physical, as well as philosophical, repercussions. We may hope that
when the situation arises in case or controversy before the Supreme
Court of the United States, the rationale for the decision will take into
consideration the not inconsiderable body of information provided by
sociology and psychology on the subject of crowd psychology, reaction
and even manipulation as well as the stirring rhetoric describing in-
spirational oratory.
A remaining problem raised by the cases concerns the behavior of
enforcement officials. As noted above in the discussion of Walker v.
City of Birmingham, Justice Stewart thought the "arbitrary or discrimi-
natory administration of the ordinance" was an important issue. Simi-
larly, in Cox v. Louisiana,28 the Court found that even though the
challenged statute was valid, the manner in which it was applied by
local officials was violative of due process. In the related case of the
23. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
24. Professor Kalven, among others, has consigned "clear and present danger"
to the conceptual ash heap, see Kalven, The New York Times Cases: A Note on the
"Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 S. CT. REV. 191, 213-14.
25. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
26. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
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same title,27 a breach-of-the-peace statute was struck down because of
the unfettered discretion it placed in the hands of local officials. Clearly
then, the dissenter is not the only beneficiary of precise legislation.
It is just as important that the public official, whether he be a com-
missioner or a police officer, know exactly the nature of his duties. The
official is frequently called upon to act in an atmosphere of heated emo-
tions and public pressures. It is only fair that he be provided with
standards to guide his performance. Clear standards serve the addi-
tional function of minimizing the possibility that policy-making offi-
cials will be embarrassed by the activities of their subordinates. Clarity
and precision in matters involving the coercive power of government is
not merely desirable, as a practical matter, in getting and upholding con-
victions; it is also a fundamental right of all Americans.
Government must be receptive to these signals and suggestions of
the Supreme Court. The problems of mass demonstrations as to politi-
cal questions are relatively new in our recent history, inasmuch as they
have become widespread, at least in the Chicago area, only within
the last few years. As a result, the supply of legal remedies available
tends to be limited and government has been forced to rely upon
"catchall" ordinances.2" Thus, at the time of the Gregory marches in
Chicago, there was no residential picketing statute that could be relied
on. The corporate authorities believed that if the totality of circum-
stances were considered, including the clear and present danger of riot,
the disorderly conduct ordinance would be applicable. The Supreme
Court of Illinois agreed; the U.S. Supreme Court did not. The interest
protected by the First Amendment is so great that the Supreme Court
has felt compelled to resolve all doubts against broad enactments in-
tended to control the myriad minor disturbances that every community
must contend with. The answer, of course, will require hard thinking
with reference to the specific evils that must be dealt with.
Justices Black and Douglas, concurring in Gregory, commented:
[O]ur Federal Constitution does not render the States powerless to
regulate the conduct of demonstrators and picketers, conduct
which is more than 'speech', more than 'press', more than 'as-
sembly', and more than 'petition' as those terms are used in the
First Amendment . . . [N]arrowly drawn statutes regulating these
these activities are not impossible to pass if the people who elect
their legislators want them passed. 29
27. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
28. Cf. Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L.
REV. 177, 223 n.155 (1967).
29. 394 U.S. 111, 124 (1969).
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Perhaps, but the burden this places upon municipal legislative drafts-
men is obvious: the need for anticipating potential sources of disruption
and for carefully isolating those interests which should be-and con-
stitutionally may be-protected through local regulation becomes greater
than ever. The difficulty, of course, is that the things that need pro-
tection are often unidentifiable until they are attacked-and then it is
too late to begin passing "narrowly drawn statutes." The necessity for
anticipation becomes critical when the locale for protest is an urban
area of high population density, where communications are instan-
taneous and public services are highly centralized. The situation clearly
is one that calls for the thoughtful, sustained efforts of the organized
municipal bar. The collective body of experience and concern of local
government lawyers must be put to work in meeting the challenge posed
by the ideal of ordered liberty. For in much of the current sloganeer-
ing, the impression is prevalent that the "establishment" is in favor of
"law and order" and against, or at least indifferent to, the freedoms of
speech and of association. But while this kind of attitude may be emo-
tionally satisfying to some, it ignores the fact that the First Amend-
ment-to the extent that it truly encourages the dissemination of in-
formation-provides the central mechanism of representative govern-
ment. It is, after all, in the awareness of public needs and desires, and
in the availability of relevant data and their interpretations that govern-
ment makes possible its own continuity.
Of course, while an analysis of developing doctrine in reviewing
court opinions suggests that First Amendment freedoms and public
order are not mutually exclusive, a realistic appraisal of the fact situa-
tions in these same cases forces us to concede that, for some people,
governmental respect for constitutional rights is quite beside the point.
These are people who are determined to be violent and lawless, for
whom arrest and trial are an integral part of a strategy of publicity.
Professor Paul Freund has written:
Not only do civil liberties vary in their quality. In some cases
it is far from clear with which side the interests of civil liberties are
to be identified.A0
In pondering this constitutional "principle of uncertainty", we would
also do well to recall an observation of Justice Robert H. Jackson:
The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty
with order and anarchy without either.31
30. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 534(1951).
31. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
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In choosing liberty with order, the government lawyer must commit
himself to a reading and understanding of both the daily newspapers and
the advance sheets; an awareness of local problems which are news-
worthy is necessary to anticipate the possible evolution of a minor
police problem into a major legal problem. An awareness of the
latest legal precedents is essential to deal with the new and novel legal
situation. The endeavor of the government lawyer in seeking and pro-
moting the fine balance between dissent and anarchy is an ever-con-
tinuing one. The reward, however, is great: the playing of a con-
structive role in an important historical development in the law.
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